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CVE-2024-44258 - Exploit for Link Following in Apple iPad OS 1

Oct 14, 20259 min read

Date of Report: 2025-05-18 | My Date: 5/24/2025 | Severity: CVSS 7.1

About

This writeup provides a detailed analysis of the Proof of Concept (PoC) for CVE-2024-44258, a symlink resolution vulnerability in the iOS backup restoration process. The PoC, hosted at missaels235/POC-CVE-2024-44258-Py, is designed for educational and research purposes, demonstrating the vulnerability without providing a fully functional exploit. Below, I analyze its technical details, implications, limitations, and broader context.

Writeup: Found on Sploitus/Github

PoC Conceptual CVE-2024-44258: Vulnerability of Symlink in iOS

Requirement: Python 3.7 + • License: MIT

Warning: This repository contains a proof of concept (PoC) developed for purposes exclusively educational and research. It is not a fully functional exploit. Its use in devices without proper authorization is prohibited.

Content

  1. Overview

  2. Vulnerability Details

  3. Scope and Limitations

  4. PoC Features

  5. Requirements

  6. Implementation Guide

  7. Exploit Real: Main Challenges

  8. Terms of Use and Exemption

  9. License

  10. Acknowledgments

Overview

This PoC illustrates conceptually CVE-2024-44258, a resolution vulnerability of symlinks during backup restoration on iOS. The objective is to demonstrate the minimum configuration necessary to exploit the fault, without offering a complete exploit.

Vulnerability Details

  • CVE ID: CVE-2024-44258
  • CWE: CWE-59 (Improper Link Resolution Before File Access)
  • Affected components: ManagedConfiguration framework and daemon profiled.
  • Summary: The backup restoration process does not verify if a path is a symlink, allowing you to write files in arbitrary locations.
  • Impact: Elevation of privileges, modification of critical files, unauthorized access.
  • Status (May 2025): Corrected in iOS 17.7.1, iOS 18.1, iPadOS 17.7.1, iPadOS 18.1, visionOS 2.1, tvOS 18.1 and later versions.
  • Patch date: October – November 2024
  • Researchers: Hichem Maloufi, Christian Mina, Ismail Amzdak

Scope and Limitations

  • Objective: Understand the internal mechanics of vulnerability.
  • Does not implement: Binary file modification Manifest.mbdb, critical step for a real exploit.
  • Outcome: Simulation of the backup structure and list of theoretical operations.

PoC Features

  1. Dependency verification: Check availability of libimobiledevice.

  2. Device detection: Wait for an iPhone connection and identify your UDID.

  3. Simulated backup generation:

    • Structure in CVE-2024-44258_PoC_Backup
    • Insert a payload file (.plist) in HomeDomain/Library/ConfigurationProfiles/
    • Create directories for SysSharedContainerDomain-systemgroup.com.apple.configurationprofiles
    • Mark the symlink in a placeholder file (Library -> SYMLINK_TARGET_ON_DEVICE)
    • Export Manifest_OPERATIONS_SIMULATED.txt with conceptual steps

  4. Restoration attempt: Use idevicebackup2 to apply the backup to the device.

Requirements

  • Host system: macOS or Linux
  • Python: ≥ 3.7
  • Libs: libimobiledevice (idevicelist, idevicebackup2 available in PATH)

Implementation Guide

Repository Cloning

git clone https://github.com/missaels235/POC-CVE-2024-44258-Py.git
cd POC-CVE-2024-44258-Py

Critical Configuration

In poc_cve_2024_44258.py, adjustment:

  • SYMLINK_TARGET_ON_DEVICE: Absolute path in iOS where the link will be created and the payload will be written.

    • It must be a path with write permissions.

    • Safe examples:

      /private/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/<APP_UUID>/tmp/ExploitDir
/private/var/mobile/Library/Caches/ExploitCache

⁇ Caution: An inappropriate route can invalidate the PoC or, in a real exploit, affect the integrity of the system.

Execution

python3 poc_cve_2024_44258.py
  1. Check dependencies.
  2. Connect the iPhone.
  3. Generate the simulated backup.
  4. Request confirmation before restoring.

Theoretical validation

If the restoration process is complete:

  1. Device access (jailbreak + SSH or Filza).
  2. Check in SYMLINK_TARGET_ON_DEVICE the file PoC_File_CVE-2024-44258.plist.
  3. Confirm payload content.

Note: No modification of Manifest.mbdb, validation is merely theoretical.

Exploit Real: Main Challenges

  1. Analysis of Manifest.mbdb: Owner binary format.

  2. Editing tools: Development in C or simil.

  3. Malicious backup construction:

    • Payload embed .plist.
    • Definition of symlinks in Manifest.mbdb.

  4. Automated restoration: The system creates symlinks and writes to the target path.

Terms of Use and Exemption

  • Academic and forensic use only.
  • Without guarantees: Code “as is ”.
  • High risk: Data loss or device brick.
  • Legal compliance: Do not promote illegal activities.
  • Total responsibility of the user.

License

Distributed under the MIT License. Consult the file LICENSE.

Acknowledgments

  • Hichem Maloufi, Christian Mina, Ismail Amzdak — Disclosure of vulnerability.
  • Libimobiledevice community — Essential tools.
  • Author: Misael S. (@ missaels235)

Grok Analysis

  1. Overview of the Vulnerability

CVE-2024-44258 is a symlink resolution vulnerability (CWE-59: Improper Link Resolution Before File Access) affecting the iOS backup restoration process, specifically within the ManagedConfiguration framework and the profiled daemon. During backup restoration, the system fails to verify whether a file path is a symbolic link, allowing an attacker to write files to arbitrary locations on the device. This can lead to privilege escalation, modification of critical files, or unauthorized access.

Key Details:

  • Affected Systems: iOS, iPadOS, visionOS, and tvOS (patched in iOS 17.7.1, iOS 18.1, iPadOS 17.7.1, iPadOS 18.1, visionOS 2.1, tvOS 18.1, and later).

  • Patch Date: October–November 2024.

  • Impact: High severity due to potential for unauthorized file writes, which could compromise system integrity or enable privilege escalation.

  • Researchers: Hichem Maloufi, Christian Mina, Ismail Amzdak.

The PoC demonstrates the vulnerability by generating a simulated backup that includes a malicious symlink, which, if exploited in a real scenario, could write a payload file (e.g., a .plist) to an unintended location.

  1. Technical Breakdown履行

The PoC is implemented in Python (version 3.7 or higher) and relies on the libimobiledevice library for interacting with iOS devices. Below is an analysis of its technical components and workflow.

PoC Workflow:

  1. Dependency Verification: Ensures libimobiledevice tools (idevicelist, idevicebackup2) are available.

  2. Device Detection: Detects a connected iPhone and retrieves its Unique Device Identifier (UDID).

  3. Simulated Backup Generation:

    • Creates a backup structure in a directory named CVE-2024-44258_PoC_Backup.

    • Places a payload file (.plist) in HomeDomain/Library/ConfigurationProfiles/.

    • Creates directories for SysSharedContainerDomain-systemgroup.com.apple.configurationprofiles.

    • Marks a symlink in a placeholder file (Library → SYMLINK_TARGET_ON_DEVICE).

    • Exports a Manifest_OPERATIONS_SIMULATED.txt file detailing theoretical operations.

  4. Restoration Attempt: Uses idevicebackup2 to apply the backup to the device.

Key Configuration:

  • SYMLINK_TARGET_ON_DEVICE: Specifies the absolute path on the iOS device where the symlink will point and the payload will be written. Examples include:

    • /private/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/<APP_UUID>/tmp/ExploitDir

    • /private/var/mobile/Library/Caches/ExploitCache

  • The chosen path must have write permissions to avoid invalidating the PoC or risking system integrity in a real exploit.

Execution Steps:

  1. Clone the repository: git clone https://github.com/missaels235/POC-CVE-2024-44258-Py.git.

  2. Configure the SYMLINK_TARGET_ON_DEVICE in poc_cve_2024_44258.py.

  3. Run the script: python3 poc_cve_2024_44258.py.

  4. Validate theoretically by checking for the payload file (PoC_File_CVE-2024-44258.plist) at the target path using jailbreak tools or file explorers like Filza.

Limitations:

  • The PoC does not modify the Manifest.mbdb file, a critical component for a real exploit, making it a theoretical demonstration rather than a functional exploit.

  • Validation requires device access (e.g., via jailbreak and SSH), limiting practical testing.

  1. Technical Strengths of the PoC

  2. Educational Value: The PoC effectively illustrates the symlink resolution flaw by simulating the backup structure and demonstrating how a malicious symlink could be exploited to write files to unintended locations.

  3. Clear Documentation: The repository provides detailed instructions, including repository cloning, configuration, execution, and validation steps, making it accessible for researchers.

  4. Dependency Management: The PoC checks for libimobiledevice availability, ensuring compatibility with macOS and Linux environments.

  5. Ethical Constraints: The PoC is explicitly designed for academic and forensic use, with warnings against unauthorized use and a clear MIT license.

  1. Technical Limitations

  2. Non-Functional Exploit: The PoC does not modify the Manifest.mbdb file, a proprietary binary format critical for real-world exploitation. This limits it to a conceptual demonstration.

  3. Dependency on Jailbreak: Validation requires jailbroken devices or specialized tools like Filza, which restricts its accessibility for testing.

  4. Manual Configuration: The user must manually specify a valid SYMLINK_TARGET_ON_DEVICE path, which requires knowledge of iOS filesystem permissions.

  5. No Automation for Real Exploit: Constructing a malicious backup and automating restoration are noted as challenges but not implemented, reducing the PoC’s immediate applicability.

  1. Challenges for a Real Exploit

The PoC outlines key challenges for turning this vulnerability into a functional exploit:

  1. Parsing Manifest.mbdb: The proprietary binary format of the backup manifest requires specialized tools, likely developed in C or similar languages.

  2. Payload Embedding: A real exploit would need to embed a malicious .plist file and define symlinks in Manifest.mbdb.

  3. Automated Restoration: The exploit would need to bypass iOS safeguards to create symlinks and write to arbitrary paths during restoration.

  4. System Integrity Risks: Incorrect paths or configurations could lead to data loss or device bricking, as highlighted in the PoC’s warnings.

  1. Security Implications

The vulnerability’s potential for privilege escalation and unauthorized file writes makes it significant. For example, an attacker could:

  • Overwrite configuration files to gain elevated privileges.

  • Modify system files to bypass security controls.

  • Access sensitive user data by redirecting files to accessible locations.

However, the requirement for physical device access (via USB) and the complexity of crafting a malicious backup limit the exploit’s feasibility for remote attacks. The patch in iOS 17.7.1 and later versions mitigates the issue, but unpatched devices remain at risk.

  1. Broader Context

Responsible Disclosure:

The vulnerability was responsibly disclosed by researchers Hichem Maloufi, Christian Mina, and Ismail Amzdak, leading to patches in October–November 2024. This highlights the importance of coordinated disclosure in securing mobile ecosystems.

iOS Security Model:

The vulnerability underscores a flaw in iOS’s backup restoration process, which typically operates with elevated privileges. The lack of symlink validation is a rare oversight in Apple’s otherwise robust security architecture, emphasizing the need for rigorous path validation in sensitive operations.

Comparison to Similar Vulnerabilities:

Symlink vulnerabilities (CWE-59) have historically affected various systems, including Linux and Windows. For example, similar issues in Android’s backup mechanisms have been exploited to achieve privilege escalation. The commonality lies in trusting user-controlled paths during privileged operations.

  1. Recommendations

  2. Patch Immediately: Users should update to iOS 17.7.1, iOS 18.1, or later to mitigate the vulnerability.

  3. Responsible Use: Researchers should adhere to the PoC’s terms, using it only for academic purposes and avoiding unauthorized device access.

  4. Improved Validation: Apple should enhance symlink checks in all filesystem operations, especially during backup restoration.

  5. Community Tools: The reliance on libimobiledevice highlights the value of open-source tools in security research, but also the need for robust, user-friendly interfaces.

  1. Conclusion

The PoC for CVE-2024-44258 effectively demonstrates a critical symlink resolution vulnerability in iOS’s backup restoration process. While limited to a theoretical simulation due to its lack of Manifest.mbdb modification, it provides valuable insight into the vulnerability’s mechanics and potential impact. Its clear documentation and ethical guidelines make it a useful tool for researchers, but the complexity of crafting a real exploit and the requirement for physical device access limit its immediate threat. The successful patching in iOS 17.7.1 and later versions reflects effective responsible disclosure, though unpatched devices remain vulnerable. This PoC serves as a reminder of the importance of rigorous path validation in secure systems and the value of community-driven security research.

References:

  • PoC Repository

  • MIT License: LICENSE

  • CVE-2024-44258 Details (assumed based on PoC documentation, as no external CVE database was accessed)

Note: This analysis is based solely on the provided PoC documentation, as per the user’s request. No external sources were consulted, and the PoC was not executed due to ethical and legal constraints.

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